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ABSTRACT 
 
A bank’s lending decision is affected by the amount of information it can access and by its capability to manage this 
information. The latter aspect implies that the bank has to decide whether borrowers should be managed in a local 
branch of the bank or in its headquarters. By looking at a sample of Finnish banks, the present research investigates a 
bank’s capability to extract profitability from both locally and centrally managed firms. We find that banks are able to 
properly discriminate between firms: those which should be managed by loan managers with expert knowledge in the 
bank’s headquarters due to their complexity, and those firms which should be managed in the bank’s local branch 
because they are simpler and need standard products and services. As a result, banks are able to extract risk-adjusted 
profitability (RAP) from both centrally and locally managed customers. Our findings clearly support the argument that 
the decision to centralise or decentralise the lending decision process is not an either/or decision: banks should implement 
both approaches and apply according to the type of firm they serve.  
 
Keywords:  Small Firms, Local Banks, Transaction Lending, Relationship Lending Risk- Adjusted Profitability  
JEL Codes: G21, G24 
 
I. Introduction 
When Florentine bankers decided to increase the loans provided to England in the 1330s, the 
English crown’s finances were already in dire straits because of the adverse outcomes of the wars in 
France. Retrospectively, it is therefore not a surprise that the default of the English crown in 1340 
helped drive the Peruzzi out of business in 1343 and the Compagnia de’ Bardi in 1346. Had they 
been able to access more information and to analyse this information properly, it is very likely that 
they would have behaved differently (Cipolla 1994, 2002). This is one of many examples in the 
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history of finance that illustrates the importance of accessing and analysing information in order to 
evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrower correctly. 
Today, banks are aware of the key role played by information and of the risk they incur when 
they evaluate the borrowers’ creditworthiness naively. This is particularly true in the case of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are characterised by a high level of opaqueness due to the 
limited information available about them (Berger and Frame 2007; Berger et al. 2001; Mason and 
Stark 2004). In order to reduce information asymmetries between a bank and a SME, loan managers 
aim to collect additional information that helps them to assess the SME’s creditworthiness. Previous 
research suggests that a loan manager’s ability to do so depends on various factors, which can be 
grouped into two major categories: (i) the characteristics of the market, the bank or the SME, and (ii) 
the characteristics of the relationship between the SME and the bank. With regard to the first 
category, scholars stress the role of the concentration of the financial system (Neuberger et al. 2008), 
since a more concentrated financial system makes it easier for the bank to access detailed information 
about the customer. Furthermore, the geographic distance between the bank and the borrower plays 
an important role in accessing information, as banks find it harder to collect information from 
distant customers (Alessandrini et al. 2009; DeYoung et al. 2008; Petersen and Rajan 2002). 
Moreover, earlier research finds that the age of the firm is a relevant factor. Younger firms are more 
affected by information asymmetry, as they do not have an established track record in terms of 
performance that can be used to evaluate the management capabilities required to be successful in the 
future (Angelini et al. 1998; Petersen and Rajan 1994). As far as the second category, i.e. the 
relationship between the SME and the bank, is concerned, research highlights the roles of the length 
and the breadth of the relationship (Berger and Udell 1995; Elsas 2005; Petersen and Rajan 1994, 
1995). Stronger relationships make it more difficult for the customer to hide information and easier 
for the bank to access additional information about the customer’s performance (Howorth et al. 
2003). However, strong relationships may lead to hold-up costs for firms (Farinha and Santos 2002; 
Greenbaum et al. 1989; Rajan 1992; Sharpe 1990), as banks may accumulate private information to 
gain monopolistic power to deter their competitors (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan 
1994). This private information leads to reduced information asymmetry between firms and banks, 
thus enabling banks to set competitive pricing strategies (Bharath et al. 2007, 2011; Cerqueiro et al. 
2011). Uchida et al. (2012) suggest that loan managers play a key role in collecting private 
information because of their repeated interactions with the same firm over time.  
A bank’s lending decision is the result of a sequential information production process. Banks 
have to structure this process in order to respond to the challenges posed by processing the collected 
information. Danos et al. (1989) divide the bank’s lending decision process into three phases: (i) the 
examination of publicly available data about a firm, (ii) the personal examination of the firm’s 
operations, and (iii) the analysis of likelihood for the loan to be repaid. The findings of Stein (2002) 
suggest that the organisational form determines the preferential use of hard or soft information and 
that the use of hard or soft information, in turn, affects lending opportunities. In order to benefit 
from lending opportunities, banks have to differentiate between the duties of decentralised and 
centralised loan managers. Lending decisions that are primarily based on soft information should be 
taken locally, whereas lending decision that are primarily based on hard information should be taken 
centrally. The work by Liberti and Mian (2009) supports this argument. The authors show that 
subjective information, for example un-quantified soft information, is difficult to use across 
organisational layers due to problems in transferring that information. Due to these problems in 
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communicating across hierarchies, the delegating of a firm to a local or central loan manager should 
depend on the nature of available information.  
All in all, previous research suggests the way in which banks decide to treat a loan application 
is an endogenous decision: banks first categorise their borrowers according to the nature of the 
available information and then select a subset of loan applications for more rigorous analysis if 
additional information about a firm is required. Banks employ this procedure because the additional 
analysis is not free of charge, as the time and effort needed in order to take the final lending decision 
generates additional costs for the bank. Thus, the additional information can have an effect on both 
the lending and the pricing decision, which is reflected in the profits a bank can derive from a 
specific customer (Liberti and Mian 2009; Uchida et al. 2012). This implies that banks should 
manage loan applications centrally if the benefits gained due to a better creditor evaluation and better 
pricing exceed the incremental costs linked to information processing because of the involvement of 
highly skilled loan managers, who spend a lot of time on their analysis. Interestingly, current research 
has not investigated such cost–benefit implications of the lending process.  
 
II. Hypotheses 
Building on Stein's (2002) notion of hierarchical and local information processing, we argue 
that loan managers who operate centrally are able to analyse firms in more detail than local managers 
and are thus able to generate additional value for the bank. This is due to the following reasons. First, 
loan managers who operate centrally provide support to multiple local branches and may therefore 
have a better overall picture of lending contracts and the level of competition in the market. This 
additional information allows them to make better-informed lending decisions as well as decisions on 
the price of the loans. Second, the risk management of complex funding transactions needs to be 
handled by loan managers with expert knowledge. Loan managers who operate locally tend to deal 
with a plethora of different customers, e.g. firms operating in different industries, who have various 
needs – loans being just one of those needs. In order to be able to respond to these needs, they need 
to have broad banking and finance knowledge. However, due to this broad knowledge local loan 
managers may lack the expert knowledge required for more complex funding transactions. Third, 
loan managers who operate centrally are typically more experienced in coping with information 
asymmetries, since they are more likely to have hard information available about the borrower (Stein 
2002).  Nevertheless, particularly in banks with flat hierarchical structures soft information – that is 
hardened by quantifying it to a measurable form (Petersen 2004) – can also be transferred from local 
loan managers to loan managers who operate centrally. In addition, loan manager who operate 
centrally might be able to access additional soft information about customers, for example, by 
looking at the interaction between the respective customer and its business partners who also happen 
to be customers of the bank. We therefore expect that limited access to soft information can be 
overcome due to the additional skills of centrally operating loan managers.  
If the process is effective, the thorough examination of a customer should allow the bank to 
select the right “problematic” customer, i.e. the customer who might be complex to evaluate, but 
who is creditworthy, and also price the loan correctly. We also argue, in line with Garicano (2000), 
that the loan managers’ expert knowledge increases the further up the hierarchical ladder they are 
found. This expert knowledge may not only enable centrally operating loan managers to assess 
borrower risk more accurately than loan managers who operate locally, but also to generate 
incremental risk-adjusted profitability (RAP) for the bank, with RAP being defined as the margin 
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generated by the customer, taking into account the level of risk incurred by the bank in dealing with 
the customer. Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge are able to generate RAP for their 
bank. 
 
If hypothesis 1 is supported, it provides evidence that banks are able to extract RAP from 
centrally managed customers, but does not tell us anything about the reasons why. We argue that 
banks should not treat all customers centrally, but only the more problematic ones. Thus, banks 
should not only allocate customers to central or local loan managers according to the information 
available about them, but also according to their risk profile. As a consequence, centrally operating 
loan managers with expert knowledge should employ their expertise to evaluate the more complex 
and opaque and therefore riskier customers. In contrast, locally operating loan managers with broad 
knowledge should capitalise the soft information gathered through their personal relationships with 
the customer in order to provide not only loans, but also other financial products. Thus, we 
hypothesise that:  
 
H2: Centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge manage only “high risk” customers 
in order to extract RAP from them. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
A. Data 
This research is based on a sample of privately owned SMEs domiciled in Finland. The loan 
database incorporates 2,522 SME-year observations from the financial period of December 2001 to 
December 2005. The data were provided by 21 small local cooperative banks. All the banks in the 
sample have a few branches and short lines of command. They tend to rely on deposits (since they 
are small, they are not able to approach regulated markets) and have very similar asset-liability mixes 
(they all tend to finance local households and small local firms). Moreover, the banks in the sample 
operate in a context characterised by limited competition. All in all, our sample is made up of banks 
that are similar, not only in terms of their cost structure, deposit and credit strategy, and asset-
liability mix, but also in terms of their management objectives and style, operating efficiency, market 
served, etc. In line with prior literature, the sample includes only non-financial SMEs. 
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Table 1. Market Characteristics 
 
This table presents the Finnish credit market for lending and guarantees (in million euros) by sector. 
 
 
 
The dataset includes firm-specific information, such as financial figures, and information 
about bank-firm relationships, such as data about loans, their characteristics and the services provided 
to firms. Both the firms’ financial figures and the bank–firm relationship data are captured at the end 
of December in each year considered. In addition, banks evaluate and assign internal credit ratings to 
firms. The internal ratings summarise information about firm quality and credit risk in broad terms, 
and they are determined on the basis of firm-specific information. Internal ratings are assigned as a 
part of complying with the Basel II capital adequacy rules by using the F-IRB (foundation internal-
rating-based approach) to estimate a firm’s probability of default1. All banks considered in our sample 
rely on the same internal rating system that exploits the same set of variables, giving them the same 
weight. This implies that the credit evaluation does not depend on the respective bank and that the 
firms considered in our sample, which migrate from one bank to another, will be rated in the same 
way. This aspect is not trivial since differences in the way in which banks evaluate and rate a firm 
could have adversely affected the consistency of our results. The internal rating system used looks at a 
firm’s performance and mainly relies on the information that the bank can access from the firm’s 
financial report and from the bank’s system archives. The loan managers who deal with the customer 
are in charge of feeding the system with data and revising the internal rating, typically on a yearly 
basis, although riskier customers may be re-evaluated more frequently. The loan managers use the 
internal rating system in order to make lending decisions. Loan managers are allowed some room for 
manoeuvre. However, when the banks deal with more complex customers. i.e. customers who ask for 
greater loans and who are considered riskier or who need finance for a complex project, the lending 
decision is taken by their headquarters, where expert loan managers scrutinise the credit request and 
the firm performance, instead of the locally operating loan manager. This happened in 195 cases in 
our dataset and is the focus of our research.  
The ratings are based on a scale ranging from 3 (highest quality) to 11 (lowest quality). The 
absence of firms with ratings of 1 or 2 is due to the fact that none of the sample firms are publicly 
                                                   
 
 
1	Banks can use this approach only subject to approval from the Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
Non-financial corporations 39,507 30,126 27,994 27,981 27,042
Financial and insurance institutions 992 767 790 586 1,269
Public sector entities and nonprofit institutions 3,669 2,092 2,555 1,619 1,508
Households 63,592 55,509 49,188 43,452 39,832
Foreign markets 12,802 7,587 5,950 6,911 9,473
Total 120,562 96,081 86,477 80,549 79,124
Non-performing assets 331 359 417 516 582
Non-performing assets to total 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7%
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listed, thus none can ever receive one of the top two internal ratings. The rating of each firm is 
included in the dataset. 
All banks in the sample are small local cooperative banks with strong links to the 
communities they serve. Table 2 presents data about them. 
 
Table 2. Bank Statistics 
 
Capital adequacy ratio (in %) is the ratio of own funds to the total amount of risk-weighted items. 
Non-performing assets (in %) is the ratio of non-performing assets including zero-interest and guaranteed 
claims to claims on the public and off-balance sheet items. 
 
 
 
The banks show differences in terms of both assets and equity: in the case of assets, the largest 
bank is almost 2.5 times the size of the smallest; regarding equity, the most capitalised bank is five 
times the size of the least capitalised one. However, by relating these numbers to the overall banking 
market in Finland, in which the total assets of all banks at the end of the sample period amount to 
294 billion €, it is apparent that these differences are marginal. The level of non-performing assets 
compared to total assets is extremely low and very similar for all the banks in the sample, reflecting 
the similar levels of risk incurred by them.  
 
B. Methodology 
In order to examine the impact of credit evaluations run centrally by loan managers with 
expert knowledge, we differentiate between firms whose credit applications were evaluated centrally 
Capital adequacy Non-performing 
Bank Net profit Assets Equity ratio % assets %
1 7,612.50 441,023.75 49,213.25 22.6 0.7
2 4,673.00 416,692.50 23,777.75 20.9 0.5
3 7,776.75 502,571.00 48,543.50 21.4 0.5
4 9,490.25 679,642.75 100,524.75 27.1 0.8
5 5,572.25 513,603.25 36,934.25 14.8 0.5
6 5,835.25 421,904.75 36,063.50 15.8 0.9
7 4,841.50 405,811.50 33,926.50 18.3 0.4
8 14,931.75 1,202,881.50 73,311.25 11.4 0.5
9 12,050.50 752,773.50 68,418.25 19.3 0.3
10 3,251.00 367,396.00 23,635.25 14.0 0.7
11 4,822.50 505,568.50 41,485.50 17.0 0.3
12 4,677.50 510,144.00 29,443.00 11.9 0.7
13 10,664.50 1,076,093.00 61,651.50 12.1 0.5
14 5,531.25 431,610.00 33,154.50 12.7 0.9
15 9,546.25 627,188.75 55,312.00 18.1 0.2
16 2,201.25 574,952.00 19,971.75 9.7 0.9
17 7,388.00 341,966.25 60,788.50 32.7 0.3
18 10,151.75 1,290,003.25 57,681.50 10.9 0.5
19 8,610.50 1,411,773.00 53,761.25 12.3 1.0
20 5,723.10 594,952.60 36,664.45 15.2 0.8
21 4,556.75 457,302.50 33,083.00 15.8 0.9
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(n=195) and firms whose credit applications were evaluated locally (n=2,327). The analysis is carried 
out using STATA version 14. In order to test H1, we regress the dummy variable SPEC, which 
indicates whether the credit application was evaluated centrally, and a set of control variables on the 
banks’ RAP using OLS. Then, we re-test H1 by using panel regression (random effects). 
To test H2, we first investigate the selection process pursued by the bank and then whether 
the loan managers contribute to the bank’s RAP. If loan managers with expert knowledge add to the 
bank’s RAP because they deal with high-risk borrowers, we should find that banks assign loan 
managers who have expert knowledge to highly opaque firms – and that these loan managers have a 
positive impact on RAP when we look at the selected firms. 
To account for the contextual factors that impact on our dependent variable but are not an 
integral part of the phenomenon, we also include control variables in the model. As discussed above 
opaqueness is a key contextual factor in lending decisions and impacts on the RAP of customers. As 
there is no direct measure for opaqueness, we draw on a set of indirect measures that reflect 
opaqueness. The proxies used are length of a relationship and the number of different banks with 
which a firm has business relationships. Longer relationships with a smaller number of banks reflect 
lower opaqueness for bank managers in loan decisions.   
Due to the possibility that our results suffer from endogeneity linked to reverse causality, we 
also implement a robustness check. Even if we find support for H1 (i.e. centrally managed customers 
generate RAP for the bank) and H2 (i.e. centrally managed customers are high risk customers and 
generate RAP for the bank), we cannot rule out completely that a bank’s decision to handle a 
customer centrally instead of locally is linked to the customer’s profitability. Banks may decide to 
centrally manage those customers whom they consider more worthwhile, so as to support them in 
more complex projects and keep them satisfied. In order to control for reverse causality, we re-
estimate the regressions using lagged observations. If there is reverse causality, the regression with the 
lagged observations should produce coefficients that are reversed.  
 
IV. Variables Description 
A. Dependent Variable 
One of the distinctive features of this work is the dependent variable. In order to test the 
hypotheses, we develop a measure for the RAP of banks. This measure is based on two different 
components, namely the margin generated from a specific customer with respect to the products and 
services sold by the bank (loans and other financial products or services) and the risk the bank incurs 
by serving this customer. 
The participating banks use activity-based costing to monitor the margin generated from 
each customer. They calculate the margin as the difference between (1) the income generated from 
the customer in terms of interest payments on short- and long-term loans as well as fees paid to the 
bank, (2) the interest that the bank has to pay to the providers of funds (be they savers, bondholders, 
etc.) plus the fees that the bank has to pay when it outsources or buys external financial services, and 
(3) the cost of the time the bank’s personnel allocates to specific customers. The internal rating used 
by the bank captures information about a customer’s financial position and is determined by firm-
specific information. Lower credit quality, as reflected in these ratings, is likely to be associated with 
less credit being granted, a higher loan price or more collateral being required. The measure of a 
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bank’s RAP from a given customer is the ratio of the margin generated from the customer, in euros, 
to the internal rating of that customer: 
 𝐑𝐀𝐏 =  𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄𝐒𝐓𝐃 𝐒𝐓𝐃 + 𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄𝐋𝐓𝐃 𝐋𝐓𝐃 − 𝒊𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 𝐒𝐓𝐃+ 𝐋𝐓𝐃 + (𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐒𝐌𝐄 − 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 − 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐑𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐍𝐆  
 
where RAP is the risk-adjusted profitability, 𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄𝐒𝐓𝐃  is the specific interest rate charged to the 
customer by the bank for short-term loans, 𝐒𝐓𝐃 is the amount of the short-term loan, 𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄𝐋𝐓𝐃  is the 
specific interest rate charged to the customer by the bank for long-term loans, 𝐋𝐓𝐃  is the amount of 
the long-term loan, 𝒊𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 is the average cost of funding for the bank, 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐒𝐌𝐄 and 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 are 
respectively the fee received from the customer and the cost of services provided to that customer that 
are outsourced or bought from other financial institutions, and Pers is the cost of the personnel 
involved in assisting the customer. Typically, centrally managed customers involve a higher 
proportion of personnel costs in their RAP. One reason for that is the transaction costs resulting 
from information travelling up and down more levels of hierarchy. With regard to centrally handled 
customers, loan managers need more time to become familiar with the specifics of the loan 
application because they cannot draw on their experience and knowledge gained from direct 
interaction with the customers.    
 
B. Independent and Control Variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use a dummy variable that records whether a loan 
manager makes a lending decision with expert knowledge in the headquarters of the bank (SPEC). 
The dummy has a value of 1 when the lending decision is taken in the headquarters of the bank and 
0 when it is taken in the local branch of the bank. A centrally pursued evaluation of a firm implies 
that loan managers with expert knowledge, who are able to allocate more time and effort in assessing 
the firm’s creditworthiness and the request for funds, are involved. As a consequence, the costs of the 
bank increase. However, a more thorough evaluation of the firm might also allow for the 
development of relational capital that increases the bank’s access to private information and may 
therefore enhance cross-selling possibilities. This implies that there is no upfront certainty about the 
relationship between SPEC and RAP. If the benefits gained from the additional information gathered 
exceed the additional personnel costs, the relationship will be positive and significant. If, however, 
the additional personnel costs out-weigh the benefits gained from the incremental information, the 
relationship will be negative and significant. A non-significant relationship implies that the impact of 
the centralisation of the lending decision on RAP is not clear. 
We also add a set of controls. First, we control for the length of the relationship between a 
firm and a bank, expressed in years (LENGTH). The length of the relationship is an indicator of 
relationship strength that is widely used in the prior literature (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and 
Rajan 1994). Since the length of the relationship increases the amount of knowledge and reduces the 
incremental costs faced by the bank in evaluating the firm’s riskiness and its financial needs, we 
expect a positive relationship between LENGTH and the bank’s RAP. Second, we control for the 
number of relationships the SME has with other banks (RELATIONSHIPS). A firm’s diversification 
of its banking services across several sources is expected to be negatively associated with the bank’s 
RAP (Elsas 2005).  
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Third, we control for the amount of loans using the total amount of loans the bank provides 
to the firm (TOTALLOANS), since the amount of loans can be an important factor in deciding to 
transfer the lending decision from the local loan manager to the headquarters. We expect the amount 
of loans to be positively associated with the bank’s RAP, since interest income increases the bank’s 
margin (as long as it does not increase borrower risk too much). Moreover, we control for the firm’s 
size, which is expressed by its assets (FIRM_ASSETS). Firms with larger assets need more funds to 
finance them and are thus expected to rely more on both long-term and short-term loans. At the 
same time, larger assets implicitly provide a greater capability for the bank to recover the loans if the 
firm defaults, thus reducing the bank’s risk. As a consequence, we expect a firm’s assets to be 
positively related to a bank’s RAP.  
Since the bargaining power of the customer is one of the core factors that affect a bank’s 
RAP, we control for the bargaining power of the customer, over and above its firm size. An SME’s 
non-size-related bargaining power is measured using its equity-to-debt ratio (EQUITY_RATIO). 
Firms with a high equity-to-debt ratio are considered financially sound and thus better able to deal 
with any difficulties. The intrinsic financial solidity of firms with high equity-to-debt ratios puts 
them in a better position to negotiate better loan terms (particularly regarding the interest rates 
charged) and lower fees for other banking services. 
A firm’s profitability is included by using its return on equity (ROE). The ROE shows the 
firm’s ability to generate profits to repay its loans. Additionally, according to pecking order theory, a 
high ROE increases the firm’s ability to use retained profit to finance its on-going operations and 
growth, thereby reducing its dependence on bank finance. The expectation is that a high ROE 
decreases the bank’s RAP. 
In order to control for overall market conditions, we include the change in gross domestic 
product (CH_GDP).  
Finally, we add a control for the bank’s size (BANK_ASSETS). RAP might be affected by a 
bank’s size as larger banks are able to offer more products and services and can therefore have more 
negotiating power and thus enjoy higher RAP. However, smaller banks might be more effective in 
selecting and keeping customers by relying on their relationship with a firm, and can thus face 
reduced risk that can be transformed into higher RAP. Since the direction of the effect is not clear, 
we do not have any expectations about whether this variable is positive or negative. 
 
V. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables considered. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
The data are bank–firm relationships of small and medium-sized firms located in Finland from year 2001 to 2005. All 
data are expressed in quantities, as percentages or in euros. The bank–firm relationship is classified as centrally managed if 
a loan manager in the bank’s headquarters manages the loan. The bank–firm relationship is classified as locally managed 
if a loan manager in a local branch of the bank manages the loan. 
 
 
 
 
               
RAP has an average value of 798, but with values spread from -3 (the least profitable 
relationship from a bank’s point of view) to 9,003 (the most profitable relationship from a bank’s 
point of view). This means that banks are able to extract margins from on-going relationships, the 
losses being almost exclusively linked to the default of the customer and the consequent write-offs 
that banks have to record. The average RAP of the subgroup of centrally evaluated firms is 2,261, 
whereas the average RAP of the subgroup of locally evaluated firms is 675. The existence of multiple 
bank relationships per SME is 0.115 on average, with 0.354 in centrally evaluated firms and 0.095 in 
locally evaluated firms. The average length of the relationship in our sample is approximately 15 
years, the longest relationship being 66 years, which suggests stable relationships between the SMEs 
and the banks. Our average relationship length is longer than the average length found in the seminal 
works by Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1995, 1994). However, it is in line with 
papers focusing on Europe (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Hernandez-Canovas and Martınez-Solano 
2010; Howorth and Moro 2012; Moro et al. 2012).  
On average, a firm’s total loans amount to 2.2 million Euros. However, centrally evaluated 
firms tend to have considerably higher total loans than locally evaluated firms. The average amount 
of a firm’s assets is 1.3 million Euros, and the average equity ratio is 26.2%, suggesting that the 
average firm is quite leveraged. A firm’s ROE amounts to an average of 37.5%. Interestingly, firms in 
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the subgroup of locally evaluated firms are more profitable in terms of their ROE than firms in the 
subgroup of centrally evaluated firms.  
In terms of correlations, RAP is positively correlated to SPEC and TOTALLOANS. As 
expected, FIRM ASSETS is positively correlated to RAP. SPEC is correlated with FIRM ASSETS, 
suggesting that centrally evaluated firms are bigger in terms of their total assets.  
 
VI. Econometric Results 
A. Main Results 
In order to test the first hypothesis, we estimate two regressions (OLS and panel regression 
with random effects) that include a dummy as a core variable that reports who evaluated the 
customer, i.e. loan managers who operate in a bank’s local branch (0) or loan managers who operate 
at its headquarters (1). The regressions also include a set of controls like the relationship’s strength, 
borrower characteristics, overall market conditions (change in GDP), bank-specific differences 
(BANK_ASSETS) and year dummies. Table 4 reports the regression results. 
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Table 4. Regression of the Role of the Bank Specialist on RAP 
 
The dependent variable is a bank’s RAP, measured at the financial year-end. 
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
SPEC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
 
 
The first regression (OLS) is significant (p < .000) and has an R2 of 0.487. The White test 
suggests some level of heteroscedasticity in the model. Thus, we use robust standard errors 
estimation. At the same time, the regression does not present collinearity problems2. The length of 
                                                   
 
 
2	All VIF-values are below 5, the mean VIF-value is 2.20.	
Number of obs. 2522 Number of obs. 2522
F(12, 2509) 35.35 Wald chi2(12) 161.84
Prob > F 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000
R-squared 0.487 R-squared (within) 0.049
Root MSE 0.718 R-squared (between) 0.465
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
SPEC Centrally (1) vs locally (0) managed customers 0.473 0.131 *** 0.552 0.223 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation 0.066 0.015 *** 0.066 0.027 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.432 0.043 *** 0.133 0.048 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.354 0.056 *** 0.436 0.093 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio -0.008 0.015 -0.065 0.021 ***
ROE Firm's return on equity 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.012
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.001 0.014 -0.014 0.009
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets 0.034 0.019 * 0.026 0.029
Year 
2002 -0.034 0.051 -0.016 0.038
2003 -0.057 0.047 -0.020 0.038
2004 0.290 0.054 *** 0.107 0.044 ***
2005 0.212 0.053 *** 0.025 0.043
CONSTANT -0.130 0.045 *** -0.078 0.042
rho
sigma_u
sigma_e
RANDOM EFFECTS
0.596
0.503
0.414
OLS
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the relationship (LENGTH) is highly significant and positive. Looking at the interest-related 
products, TOTALLOANS is positive, as expected, and is highly significant. Thus, there is evidence 
that the strength of the relationships and the amount of short- and long-term loans provided to 
SMEs contribute to a bank’s RAP. As expected, a firm’s size (FIRM_ASSETS) impacts positively on 
a bank’s RAP, while a firm’s financial solidity (EQUITY_RATIO) and profitability (ROE) are not 
significant. Finally, market conditions (CH_GDP) are not significant, whereas the control for bank 
size (BANK_ASSETS) is weakly positive and significant.   
Our variable of interest (SPEC) is positive and significant, suggesting that centrally evaluated 
firms contribute positively to a bank’s RAP. This positive relationship suggests that the benefits 
linked to the activities pursued by centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge for the 
respective customer prevail over the additional costs accrued because of the extra time and possibly 
higher personnel costs.  
The second regression presents the results estimated using a panel random effect regression. 
In this regression the firm-specific effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent 
variables. The regression is significant (p < .000)3. The relationship variables follow the same pattern 
as in the other specification: LENGTH and TOTALLOANS are positive and significant. Regarding 
firm variables, FIRM_ASSETS is highly significant and positive. In this specification, 
EQUITY_RATIO is highly significant and is negative as was expected. In line with the first 
regression CH_GDP and BANK_ASSETS are not significant. Further, SPEC is positive and 
significant, confirming the role centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge play in 
contributing to a bank’s profitability. 
However, this first level of analysis only tells us that centrally managed customers are able to 
contribute to the bank’s RAP, but does not tell us the reasons why. In order to investigate why 
customers are managed centrally (H2) we estimate an instrumental variable regression with an 
endogenous regressor. First, we separately estimate a probit regression for SPEC on a set of 
independent variables and year dummies4. We model the selection process according to a firm’s 
information asymmetry, the firm’s characteristics (risk of the firm) and its performance. As far as 
information asymmetry is concerned, we use a set of variables that measure whether a bank is 
adversely affected in accessing information. More specifically, we look at the firm’s number of 
relationships with other banks (RELATIONSHIPS) and its length of the relationship with the bank 
(LENGTH). In terms of risk we include the amount of the firm’s assets (FIRM_ASSETS), the 
amount of loans (TOTALLOANS), the return on equity (ROE) and the equity ratio 
(EQUITY_RATIO). The results are reported in table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
 
3 Within R
2 of 0.049 and between R
2 of 0.465. 
4	VIF values are below 5, the mean VIF value is 1.08.	
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Table 5. Probability of a Firm to be Managed Centrally or Locally 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
RELATIONS is the number of bank relationships that a firm has.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
 
We find that the relationship variables (RELATIONSHIPS, LENGTH, TOTALLOANS) as 
well as ASSETS and EQUITY_RATIO are significant. All of these variables are positive except for 
LENGTH. Our findings suggest that the probability of being evaluated by loan managers in the 
bank’s headquarters decreases with the length of the relationship and increases with the number of 
banks the firm borrows from. This implies that more opaque firms are more likely to be managed 
centrally. In addition, the probability of being evaluated by loan managers in the bank’s headquarters 
increases with the amount of loans provided to the borrower, possibly because higher lending 
2522
209.90
0.000
0.295
-484.200
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>t
RELATIONS Number of bank relations 0.179 0.034 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation -0.231 0.051 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.224 0.048 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.405 0.060 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio 0.157 0.040 ***
ROE Firm's return on equity -0.030 0.049
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.055 0.045
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets -0.007 0.052
Year 
2002 0.447 0.282
2003 0.368 0.284
2004 0.705 0.280 **
2005 0.648 0.281 **
CONSTANT -2.213 0.269 ***
Selection of lending evaluation
PROBIT SPEC
Number of obs.
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikehood
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volumes increase the potential loss at default and therefore the bank’s risk. Finally, the probability of 
being evaluated centrally increases with the firm’s assets, implying that centrally operating loan 
managers with expert knowledge are asked to deal with more complex projects that require a more 
thorough evaluation of the customer. All in all, the regression suggests that firms evaluated by 
centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge are more opaque and riskier, and invest 
more. As a consequence, they are also more complex to deal with. However, are firms that are more 
complex to deal with also the ones that generate higher RAP for the bank?  
To answer this question, we re-estimate our model by using instrumental variable regression 
(TREATREG). This allows us to examine whether centrally managed firms are also the ones that 
impact positively on RAP. The results are reported in table 6. 
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Table 6. Instrumental Variable Regression of the Role of Bank Specialists on RAP 
 
The dependent variable in the first-stage is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is centrally managed and 0 
otherwise. The dependent variable in the second-stage is the bank’s RAP, measured at the financial year-end. 
 
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
RELATIONS is the number of bank relationships that a firm has.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
 
2522
419.87
0.000
16.195
0.000
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
RELATIONS Number of bank relations 0.176 0.035 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation -0.221 0.051 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.179 0.037 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.423 0.062 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio 0.160 0.040 ***
ROE Firm's return on equity -0.041 0.049
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.055 0.045
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets -0.010 0.052
SPEC Lending technology 0.407 0.148 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation 0.064 0.015 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.435 0.043 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.362 0.057 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio -0.001 0.015
ROE Firm's return on equity 0.007 0.011
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.001 0.013
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets 0.035 0.018 * 
Year 
2002 -0.034 0.051
2003 -0.057 0.047
2004 0.290 0.054 ***
2005 0.212 0.053 ***
CONSTANT -0.125 0.045 ***
rho
sigma
lambda
F(1,2513)
Prob > F
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
TREATREG
Number of obs.
0.034
Selection of lending evaluation
Regression on RAP
0.047
0.716
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We determine the strength of our instrument by calculating the F statistics. The F value is 
16.20 and not smaller than the critical value, which supports the view that our instrument is not 
weak. The model suggests that the coefficients of the selection of customer evaluation are 
qualitatively similar to those of the probit model. In addition, the results on RAP are close to the 
results of OLS regression on RAP. Finally, in the instrumental regression, SPEC is positive and 
significant, suggesting that firms which are evaluated by loan managers in a bank’s headquarters 
increase the bank’s RAP. Thus, we find support for the fact that banks select more opaque, riskier 
and more complex firms to be evaluated by centrally operating loan managers, who are, in turn, able 
to extract profitability from them.  
 
B. Robustness Checks 
As discussed in the hypotheses section, banks might decide to manage firms centrally because 
they consider them important due to the possibility to generate a high RAP. In this case, the bank 
would be aware of the additional value provided by these firms and therefore decide to deal with 
them centrally in order to grant them a high quality service and to consolidate their relationship with 
them. As a consequence, there would be reverse causality between RAP and being centrally managed. 
In order to investigate this possible issue, we re-estimate the regression using one-year lagged 
variables. If centrally managed firms are the ones that are considered more important for the bank 
because of the RAP they are generating, we should find a negative significant relationship between 
the variable of interest (SPEC) and RAP. The results are reported in table 7. 
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Table 7. Regression of the Role of Bank Specialists on Lagged RAP 
 
The dependent variable is the bank’s RAP lagged one year.  
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
SPEC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
 
The regression is significant (p < .000). LENGTH and TOTALLOANS are positive and 
significant. As far as the variables of a firm are concerned, only FIRM_ASSETS is significant and has 
the expected result. In line with the first model, CH_GDP is not significant and BANK_ASSETS is 
Number of obs. 1729
F(12, 2509) 38.15
Prob > F 0.000
R-squared 0.583
Root MSE 0.638
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
SPEC Centrally (1) vs locally (0) managed customers 0.502 0.155 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation 0.063 0.018 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.456 0.039 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.343 0.076 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio 0.002 0.018
ROE Firm's return on equity -0.007 0.014
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.022 0.016
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets 0.033 0.020
Year 
2003 -0.022 0.052
2004 -0.044 0.051
2005 0.226 0.055 ***
CONSTANT -0.119 0.051 **
OLS, lagged
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positive, but not significant. Interestingly, SPEC is again positive and significant. This evidence rules 
out reverse causality. 
Finally, it might be argued that our analysis suffers from endogeneity, since the dependent 
variable is affected by the internal rating of a firm as well as the decision process, which is manifested 
in the independent variables. In order to rule out this issue, we retest our specifications using the 
absolute return of the customer as a dependent variable (detailed results not reported here). 
Interestingly, we obtain the same results as the ones presented in tables 4 to 7. More importantly, the 
variable SPEC is always positive and significant. In addition, its coefficients are not significantly 
different from those presented in tables 4 to 7. 
 
VII. Discussion 
Our analysis provides interesting results that are in line with the findings of Stein (2002) and 
Liberti and Mian (2009). Lending approaches change according to the type of customer and the 
information banks can access. Customers whose creditworthiness is easy to evaluate, because the 
information about them is mainly soft and accessible for local loan managers as well as those who 
need plain vanilla loans, are managed by loan managers in local branches of the bank. In contrast, 
customers who are characterised by a high level of information asymmetry, who pursue highly 
complex projects or who increase the exposure of the bank regarding the amount of the loan, are 
managed by loan managers in the bank’s headquarters. In the latter case, banks can be adversely 
affected by the loss of soft information, but at the same time benefit from the expert knowledge of 
the loan managers involved in evaluating the creditworthiness of the customers.  
Our results suggest that this strategy pays. By evaluating “simple” customers locally, banks 
can benefit from reduced costs in managing them and local loan managers can exploit their personal 
knowledge of them. Regarding “complex” customers, a bank’s centrally operating loan managers with 
expert knowledge are able to turn high risk and potentially low return customers into highly 
rewarding ones by increasing the bank’s RAP. This happens for various reasons. First, loan managers 
who operate centrally are able to employ their expertise to make an informed decision about whether 
to lend to a customer or not. In addition, not only are they able to price a loan according to the 
riskiness of the customer, they can also propose and sell financial products (e.g. loans) that better fit 
the customer’s needs, implicitly reducing the risk the bank can incur when the borrower is asked to 
deal with a loan that does not match its cash flows. 
 Since centrally operating loan managers increase the RAP realized from the respective 
customer, banks could be tempted to move lending decisions entirely to their headquarters. 
However, our analysis suggests that this would be the wrong way to operate since loan managers who 
operate locally are able to generate RAP. The complete centralisation of the lending decision process 
would lead to an ineffective and inefficient use of resources. This point is strongly supported by the 
key role played by local loan managers in our sample: the largest majority of the loans (more than 
92%) are managed by loan managers in local branches and contribute to the profitability of the bank. 
This implies that local loan managers are able to contribute dramatically to a bank’s profitability. At 
the same time, the limited number of loans that are managed by loan managers in a bank’s 
headquarters suggests that banks are very selective about allocating firms to centrally operating loan 
managers with expert knowledge. Possibly, they are aware of the additional costs incurred by 
involving expert staff and thus try to keep their use of them to a minimum. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
For many years, research on bank lending has investigated how both soft and hard factors 
affect lending relationships. Firm characteristics, such as the age of a firm, the length of a lending 
relationship and the concentration of the bank system are just some of the aspects that have been 
examined and their impact on both banks (in terms of reduction of the risk incurred) and firms (in 
terms of access to credit) have been discussed. In particular, Stein (2002) and Liberti and Mian 
(2009) proposed that banks should employ different lending approaches according to the customers 
they have and the information they are able to exploit. Whereas complex customers who can mainly 
provide hard, factual data should be analysed centrally, less complex but very opaque customers 
should be examined locally by using soft information. 
 Our findings provide support for Stein's (2002) arguments. We find that banks are 
able to extract profitability from their lending relationships both when they manage their borrowers 
in the bank’s headquarters and in its local branches. Nevertheless, borrowers who are evaluated 
centrally are those who bear greater risk, since they are more complex and characterised by a higher 
degree of opaqueness that can only partially be addressed by centrally operating loan managers. By 
managing high-risk customers in a bank’s headquarters, banks are able to reduce the risk and to 
extract RAP from them as well. In particular, we contribute to Stein (2002) and Liberti and Mian 
(2009) by showing that communication in hierarchies allows for specialised knowledge 
accumulation. Our findings also contribute to Garicano's (2000) notions of the specialisation of 
knowledge in hierarchies, not just the transmission of information.  
However, our research has several limitations: first, it relies on a dataset that considers only 
observations from Finland. Prospective research should try to investigate whether our findings hold 
true in other bank contexts. Second, it uses data from before 2008. We cannot rule out that the 
financial crisis and the changes in the banking regulation impacted on the way banks decide how to 
treat borrowers. In particular, it would not be very surprising to discover that banks now manage a 
larger percentage of borrowers centrally.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study indicates that banks are able to properly select 
and manage their borrowers: they can extract RAP from both easy-to-treat borrowers, who are 
managed locally, and more complex borrowers, who are managed centrally by loan managers with 
expert knowledge.  
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